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While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the
relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation
have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect
parties. This article addresses these questions using a qualitative case study of the
relationship between mayors and the three faces of their parties (in local public
office, local central office and on the ground) in Genoa and Lausanne. Based on
interviews with the mayors, elected representatives and party members, it finds in
the two cases that, as long as these mayors can count on high levels of popularity
and are not nearing the end of their term, they are ‘party detached’. When these
factors do not apply and/or party institutionalization increases, the relationship
with the party in local central office (although not with the party in local public
office or on the ground) becomes more significant.
OVER THE PAST DECADE, SCHOLARSHIP ON LOCAL POLITICS HAS
devoted considerable attention to the effects of reforms introducing
directly elected mayors in European cities (Ba¨ck et al. 2006;
Reynaert et al. 2009). Much of that work has focused on the new
pressures faced by mayors, whose greater visibility, legitimacy and
formal powers fuel a perceived demand for stronger leadership
within a context of increasingly complex local policymaking (Borraz
and John 2004; Le Gale`s 2002; Verheul and Schaap 2010). However,
while these and other studies have been extremely useful for
understanding many of the effects of the introduction of directly
elected mayors, the literature on European local politics has almost
without exception (see Copus 2006, 2009) ignored the following key
question: How, under the new system, do the different faces of party
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organizations within cities – that is, the party in local central office,
in local public office and on the ground (Katz and Mair 1993) –
relate to and understand the roles of those directly elected mayors
whose candidatures they have backed? And, vice versa, how do the
new mayors relate to and understand the roles of their parties?
These are not secondary questions in our view. Not only are they
essential to understanding the effects of local democracy reforms
on subnational politics, but they can also shed light on long-term
changes in contemporary political parties. According to Richard
Katz and Peter Mair’s theory of party organizational change (1995,
2009), the party in public office has become by far the most
powerful of the three faces of party organizations. In tandem with
this, political campaigning has become more personalized and we
have seen greater presidentialization of institutional leadership (see,
for example, Poguntke and Webb 2005). However, these scholars
primarily have the national level in mind when assessing and
discussing party change. So, while the party in national public office
may well dominate far more than previously (especially in the cases
of traditional mass-party organizations) and leaders in national
office have more power vis-a`-vis the party on the ground than in the
past, we do not know how party change plays out locally under
different contextual opportunities and constraints. Nor do we know
whether it does so uniformly.
Indeed, the picture as regards the interaction between the
different faces of the party is not accepted by all: for example, some
scholars (Scarrow 1996; Seyd and Whiteley 2002) contend that,
while absolute numbers may have fallen, the decline of grassroots
membership influence within parties may have been overstated.
Likewise, and of particular relevance to this article, the political
salience of local factors within parties at subnational level may be
higher amid decentralization processes (Ansell and Gingrich 2003;
Hopkin and van Houten 2009) and within long-standing federal
systems (Carty and Eagles 2005). To put it simply, while there
remains much within the ‘black box’ of party organization and
change generally that we do not know about, this is particularly the
case at local level. In fact, as we shall see in this article, and as Annick
Magnier (2004: 180) argues, while there has been an ‘individualiza-
tion of the representative process’ in subnational politics along
with greater personalization and presidentialization, this does not
necessarily mean that local party elites, council representatives
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and grassroots members cannot play important – and sometimes
decisive – roles.
In this article we address the questions raised above. In particular,
we consider how the relationship between mayors and parties (and
their respective roles) are perceived by the mayors themselves and
the different faces of the party: in local central office, in public office
and, finally, a group too often overlooked by studies of political
parties (van Haute 2011: 7–22): the grassroots members of the party
on the ground. In so doing, we draw on a set of 18 individual and
two group interviews with mayors, representatives and active party
members conducted in two Western European cities, Genoa and
Lausanne. This makes our study the first of its type within the
literature on local European politics since, to our knowledge, no
other scholars have investigated the mayor–party relationship using
this type of in-depth qualitative approach across these different
groups of actors. Nor, it obviously follows, have they done so in
different countries.
The article is organized as follows. In the first section, we discuss
some of the broad considerations underpinning our research and
shaping our analytical framework. In the second, we introduce our
two cases and briefly outline the methods used to examine them. In
the third section, we present our findings and compare the relation-
ship between local parties and the mayor in the two cities. In the
fourth, we provide a brief epilogue to the two cases and discuss our
findings in the context of our analytical framework. Finally, we offer
some conclusions and suggestions for future research.
MAYORAL AGENCY BETWEEN PERSONAL, PARTISAN AND
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
In order to analyse mayor–party relations, we use a strategic-
relational approach, in which structures and agents are not isolated.
Rather, their existence is seen as mutually constitutive (Hay 2002:
126–34). The strengthening of local executive power, especially the
enhanced and often more formally autonomous roles of mayors with
respect to those parties supporting their candidatures, affects a
series of complex relationships and contains potential effects which
may differ considerably from case to case. In principle, the move
from indirect elections – with council chambers rather than the
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public electing the mayor – to direct ones ought to increase the
autonomy of mayors vis-a`-vis their executive (their cabinet), the
council chamber and local party elites. In other words, the mayor
should become more autonomous in relation to the rest of the party
in local public office, the party in local central office and the party
on the ground. However, in practice, we know little about how
this multifaceted relationship is structured. To find out, we need to
have a clear framework of analysis which allows us to focus on the
different factors in play.
Broadly speaking, relative mayoralty autonomy can be seen as the
outcome of a tension between the mayor’s twin roles (Fallend et al.
2006: 245). On the one hand, mayors are party representatives or, in
the case of ‘civil society’ and other non-party figures, have at least
been selected by parties as ‘their’ mayoral candidates. On the other
hand, mayors should also be representatives of the whole citizenry,
thus – to some extent – distancing themselves from their local party.
This in turn relates to a key tension in how individual mayors
interpret their role, with some being more ‘party loyalist’ and others
more ‘party detached’ (Copus 2006: 64–5, 2009: 20). While of
course it has always formally been the case that the mayor should be
‘of everyone’, the introduction of direct elections – with the mayor
receiving a personal mandate from the public – has often been
accompanied in places such as Italy and England by rhetoric
focusing on precisely this aspect (see, for example, Diamanti 2002).
Nonetheless, we do not know the degree to which this super partes
role of the mayor is in practice accepted by the mayors themselves
and by the representatives and members of the mayor’s own party.
While the separation of powers, as a consequence of a distinct
election of the mayor, tends to facilitate the presidentialization of
representation (Samuels and Shugart 2010), the impact of the
introduction of direct elections is not always uniform, but rather
interacts not only in each country, but also in each city (Berg and
Rao 2005), with a specific related set of institutional, personal and
partisan factors. These provide a framework of relationship constraints
and opportunities affecting all local political actors: from the party elites
to the members of the mayoral executive to the party representatives in
the council chamber and, of course, to the mayor.
As regards institutional factors, we also have to consider how
direct-election reforms shape new government patterns and the
degree to which they strengthen mayors within the city government
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and local politics generally (Ba¨ck 2005; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006).
Once elected, mayors find themselves within a structure of (formal
and informal) institutional rules, cultures and incentives which
define the parameters of their leadership and shape their relation-
ship with their executives and parties. Mayors, of course, are not only
bound by structures. They also have agency – theoretically, much
more so in the cases of directly elected mayors with greater formal
powers. They can seek to dominate decision-making prerogatives,
presenting themselves as the supreme authority of the government
(with a democratic mandate to do so) or they can share their
authority to different degrees with the other members of their
executive (Ba¨ck 2005; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006; Mouritzen and
Svara 2002).
Personal factors may include the degree of party loyalty felt by
individual mayors and their particular style of governing, which may
be more, as we have said, ‘party loyalist’ or ‘party detached’. As Luigi
Burroni et al. (2009: 11) contend in reference to the Italian case, the
‘style of the mayor’ – while difficult to quantify – can be a crucial
variable in understanding how he/she interacts with the executive.
In performing their role and in their relationship with their party,
mayors can mobilize different forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986).
These include: symbolic-reputational capital, such as public and
media popularity; social capital, including relational and mediation
capabilities; economic capital, including own funding for election
campaigns; and political capital, deriving from their prior experi-
ences and career paths, which may define them as party ‘outsiders’
or ‘insiders’ (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 67).
Partisan factors can include the institutionalization of the party
organization, the party’s electoral strength and its candidate selection
rules. On the first point, it is clear that the solidity of organizational
structures and the capacity of the local party leadership to enforce
decisions, especially regarding the recruitment of those standing for
public office, are crucial to this discussion (Panebianco 1988: 53–68).
Second, the traditional electoral strength of the party in the city is
obviously another key variable in the mayor–party relationship – for
example, if a party is very strong electorally, this is likely to increase its
leverage on individual mayors (since it makes it easier for the party to
withdraw support for re-election in the knowledge that a new mayoral
candidate sponsored by the party is likely to win). By contrast, the
opposite should hold in those cities in which a particularly popular
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candidate can deliver victory for a party where it is traditionally weak.
Third, a key role is played by the formal (and informal) arrangements
for mayoral candidate selection, which can be more or less inclusive,
ranging from those placing the choice to different degrees in the
hands of grassroots members (the party on the ground) or in those of
the elites in the local party central office or in those of the national
party (whether in central or public office) (Hazan and Rahat 2010:
33–55).
As we have said, the combination and interplay between these
factors may differ between cities (and over time within single cities).
Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage how the mixture of such
factors could have a great impact on the mayor–party relationship.
To take one (extreme) example: in a city with very strong electoral
support for the mayor’s party, high party institutionalization and low
personal capital of the mayor (in terms of popularity above and
beyond his/her party identity), we would expect to find that, once in
office, such a mayor has to devote great attention to his/her
relationship with the three different faces of the party (particularly
the party in central and public office) and consequently sacrifices
much of the formal institutional autonomy granted by the law in
order to safeguard partisan support. This in turn brings us to
another key point: it is important to remember that, even with the
direct election of the mayor, candidatures (and re-candidatures) for
local elections in Western Europe tend to remain a matter of party
selection (Ba¨ck 2006: 133; Magnier 2006: 357). Of course, the
factors we have identified above will all impinge on how parties
exercise that choice, but it remains – even at a time of party
organizational decline, personalization, presidentialization and so
on – a party prerogative.
There is much, therefore, to keep in mind when considering how
the relationship between the mayors and parties continues after
victorious election campaigns are over. Not least, as we have said, the
need for mayors to consider re-election. Discussing leadership
autonomy in presidential regimes, Poguntke and Webb (2005: 5)
argue that ‘while in office, the head of the executive is well
protected against pressure from his own party’ but that ‘his power to
lead depends directly on his electoral appeal’. So too does the
mayor’s power to continue leading. For, while campaigns and media
coverage may be more personalized and the practice of institutional
roles more presidentialized, mayoral candidates usually do still require
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support from parties in order to get elected (and re-elected) – not only
as regards securing a party nomination, but also in terms of finance,
personnel, mobilization and campaign expertise. Moreover, while in
office, and irrespective of their electoral appeal, mayors often require
the cooperation and assistance of ‘their’ parties – party leaders in
local central office, councillors in local public office and grassroots
members – to achieve consensus on policies at local level. The task we
are faced with in this article, therefore, is to understand how this
relationship with the different faces of the parties is played out.
THE CASES: GENOA AND LAUSANNE
In our research project, we decided to adopt a small-N comparison
in order to consider mayor–party relationships in depth. The
empirical work on local democracy to date has tended to be large-
scale and quantitative (for example, Ba¨ck et al. 2006; Berg and Rao
2005), looking at broad trends across a large set of cities rather than
focusing on a small number of cases in greater detail. We chose
instead to examine two mayors and their parties in the cities of
Genoa and Lausanne, the former in a recently decentralized
democracy with traditionally strong party organizations (Italy) and
the latter in a country with a long-standing federalist tradition and
weaker party organizations (Switzerland). With a population of just
over 600,000, Genoa is the fifth largest Italian city while Lausanne, with
around 130,000 inhabitants, is the fourth city in Switzerland. In sum,
our qualitative-comparative study is based on a contrast of contexts
(Collier 1993: 108; Skocpol and Somers 1980: 170–81), especially with
reference to institutional patterns, party legacies and organizations,
combined with a common recent electoral system change.
It is worth mentioning at this point that – despite the differences
between the two cases – we began the project with the expectation
that, in both cities, the presence of direct elections would increase
not only the formal autonomy but also the informal autonomy
of the mayors vis-a`-vis their parties, particularly as regards the
mayor’s relationships with the party in local central office and
the party in local public office. To use Copus’s term, we imagined
that the mayors in Genoa and Lausanne would be – albeit possibly
to different degrees – ‘party detached’. However, we did not know
whether this would be homogeneous or if there would be
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differences – both within each case and between the two cases –
concerning the mayor’s relationships with the party in public office
and the party in central office. Finally, given the absence of studies
on directly elected mayors and party members in Europe, not to
mention the general lack of empirical work on party members, our
expectations were very tentative in this respect and were largely
based on Katz and Mair’s theories (1993) regarding the increasing
distance between the party in public office and the party on the
ground.
At the time of our research in 2011, both Genoa and Lausanne
had mayors who were party representatives in charge of centre-left
governments – Daniel Bre´laz of the Greens in Lausanne and Marta
Vincenzi of the centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico –
PD) in Genoa. Both had been involved for several decades in politics
in their respective cities and had built up strong public profiles
before becoming mayor. Both were considered by local media to
enjoy wide popularity. There were also important differences,
however. Vincenzi was a long-standing representative of a party that
had dominated politics for decades in Genoa – the Democratic Party
and its various predecessor parties stretching back to the Italian
Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano – PCI). Despite this,
she was seen as a maverick and outside the local party elite inner
circle. By contrast, Bre´laz was a representative of a relatively young
and non-traditional party, the Greens, which he himself had played
the central role in building up in Lausanne and the surrounding
region. Moreover, for many years he had been considered the
dominant personality locally within his party. Thus, while Vincenzi
was a member of a former mass party which – as we shall see – is now
organizationally (but not electorally) weaker than previously, Bre´laz
was a member of a movement which is institutionalizing and
becoming more like a ‘normal’ party.
Local government leadership has also differed considerably in
the two countries and cities. Prior to the introduction of directly
elected mayors in 1993 in Italy (outlined below), local party
secretaries and elites usually decided who would be mayor and
subsequently wielded enormous influence over ‘their’ mayors in
his/her decisions (Baldini and Legnante 2000: 239). Since the 1993
reform, however, mayors have become – at least formally and in the
media perception – strong, independent figures with a clear mandate
to govern (Magnier 2004: 167). In Switzerland, the situation is quite
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different: at all levels of government, collective and ‘consociational’
models dominate (Ladner 2005). What makes Lausanne particularly
interesting for comparison, however, is that, unlike most Swiss cities, in
Lausanne the direct election of the mayor is (as in Genoa) a relatively
recent phenomenon. It was introduced in 1980 as a result of a cantonal
popular initiative, thanks to which the mayor would no longer be
chosen by the city council, but directly by the voters in a separate
election, held after two previous rounds, electing first the councillors
and, second (from this first group), the members of the executive
(with the mayor then being elected from this latter group) (Borraz
1996). Two points are worth noting here as regards the introduction of
directly elected mayors in Lausanne: (1) under this system, the mayor
may also be elected ‘tacitly’ – that is, in the event that the parties decide
on a common candidate from among those elected to the executive in
the second round of elections, the mayor is automatically elected
unopposed; (2) much like in England over the past decade, while the
new mayors of course have the symbolic capital of being ‘chosen by the
people’, this – unlike the Italian case as we see below – has not been
backed up by the introduction of any significant new formal powers.
Rather, the collegiate city government continues to be responsible for
all executive functions and the mayor presides over this body in a style
usually described as consociational (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006: 31–4).
While the introduction of direct elections in Lausanne therefore
can be seen as a bottom-up reform that did not, however, provide
the mayor with any new formal powers, the first direct elections in
Genoa in 1993 were the result of a major nationwide top-down
reform, radically changing Italian local democracy’s institutional
rules, balances and voting system during a period of massive
changes generally within the country’s politics. The most important
innovations of the 81/1993 law relevant to our discussion in this
article were that: (1) it made the position of mayor directly elected
by the public rather than by the parties in the council chamber, as
had previously been the case; (2) the mayor was given sole power to
appoint and dismiss the members of his/her executive and these
could no longer serve contemporaneously in the council chamber.
Mayors would also be responsible for appointing all representatives
of the municipality to other institutions, boards and so on. In theory
at least, this gave the mayor much greater autonomy from party
control over the distribution of such positions, which, previously, had
been divided out among parties as part of an elaborate spoils-sharing
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process; (3) according to the formula of simul stabunt simul cadent
(‘as they stand, so they fall’), although the council chamber could
still pass a motion of no-confidence in the mayor, his/her removal
would also now provoke the dissolution of the chamber and hence
new elections for all (Baldini and Legnante 2000: 241–2). Not
surprisingly, this has provided the new mayors with far greater
stability than under the previous system.
The Mayors
There is not the space here to embark on a long description of the
political careers of Bre´laz and Vincenzi; however, it is necessary to
provide a brief overview. In particular, it is worth outlining how each
became mayor: in both cases, their reputations as popular vote-
getters were the key factors in their initial selection. When faced with
the possibility of a defeat by the centre-right, the centre-left in both
Genoa and Lausanne opted for the candidate most likely to win
rather than the best-placed member of the dominant party elite.
Bre´laz became mayor of Lausanne in November 2001, as the
candidate of an alliance between the Greens and the party which
had dominated politics in the city for many years, the Socialist
Party (Parti Socialiste – PS). Given the prospect of the unpopular
outgoing Socialist mayor, Jean-Jacques Schilt, being defeated, the
Socialist Party elite decided to cede its control of the position of
mayor and back the popular Green leader Bre´laz, who subsequently
easily defeated his centre-right opponent, taking 64 per cent of the
vote. His victory was another milestone in a very successful political
career. In addition to his central role in the history of the Greens,
both locally and nationally, he had been a regional councillor
since 1978, a federal parliament member (the first Green one in
Switzerland) from 1979 to 1989, and he had also been a member of
the Lausanne city council executive since 1989 (indeed, in 1993 and
1997, he received the highest personal vote of all candidates in the
council election). He thus was someone who had considerable
experience of how collegiate government worked at different levels
and, as we have said, was a very popular figure both among the
public and in the media.
Until 2006, Bre´laz was the sole Green representative in the seven-
member Lausanne executive. Since April 2006, a second Green
Party representative, Jean-Yves Pidoux, has also been part of the
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executive, reinforcing the role of the party within the local
red–green coalition government. Over the same period, however,
Bre´laz’s popularity declined. While Bre´laz was elected with 52 per
cent in 2006 (the highest personal vote of any candidate standing
either for the council or the executive), in March 2011 – surprising
both media commentators and other politicians – he only finished
sixth in the first round of the council elections (see the explanation
of the voting system above). Nonetheless, the Green/Socialist Party
alliance decided to re-propose him as mayor. Given that the centre-
right had no strong candidate to present against him, Bre´laz was
thus re-elected by default.
As mentioned earlier, Vincenzi’s path to the mayoralty – like that
of Bre´laz – was shaped by centre-left fears that it might lose the
election. A lifelong member of the Italian Communist Party and
then its social democratic successor parties, Vincenzi had been Left
Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra – DS) president of Genoa
Province from 1993 to 2002 and was then elected a member of the
European Parliament (with a huge personal vote) for the north-
western constituency of Italy in 2004. It was therefore to the surprise
(and, as various interviewees confirmed off the record, dismay) of
the local Left Democratic elite in Genoa that she announced in 2006
her intention to run for mayor in 2007 (for a fuller explanation of
Vincenzi’s candidature, see McDonnell 2008: 96–9). Had the
selection system functioned as it had up until then, with mayoral
candidates chosen simply by the local Left Democratic elite (and
accepted by their electorally much weaker junior coalition partners),
Vincenzi’s aspiration would most likely have remained unfulfilled.
However, by 2006, the situation in Italy as regards candidate
selection on the centre-left had changed considerably, first and
foremost because of its use of primaries at the subnational level to
choose candidates for the top directly elected institutional offices.
The presence of this new structural element – the primaries – gave
Vincenzi far greater agency possibilities. To cut a long story short,
given the centre-left coalition’s problems in government at national
level (where Romano Prodi’s administration was in enormous
difficulty and its poll ratings were plunging), along with Vincenzi’s
strong hint that she would stand against an official Left Democratic
candidate were she not selected, the national Left Democrats party
hierarchy stepped in and expressed its support for Vincenzi. She was
duly chosen as the party’s sole candidate in the February 2007
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centre-left primary, which she easily won. Despite her popularity, she
only won the mayoral election three months later with 51.2 per cent
of the vote – a result that was considered to reflect more the general
dissatisfaction felt by centre-left voters with the national centre-left
government than any sudden decline in popularity of the new mayor
(McDonnell 2008).
Methods
As explained earlier, our aim in this research project was to
investigate the relationship between the directly elected mayor and
the different faces of his/her own party and how this is perceived by
the relevant actors within that relationship: the mayors themselves,
members of their executive, local party leaders, councillors and
grassroots party members. To do this, we require in-depth knowl-
edge of the views of these actors. The discussion in the next section
is therefore based on a total of 18 individual and two group face-to-
face interviews comprised as follows: semi-structured interviews with
the two mayors, nine semi-structured interviews with members of the
executive in the two cities (four in Genoa, five in Lausanne), six
semi-structured interviews with members of the city council chamber
(three in Genoa, three in Lausanne), interviews with the Democratic
Party provincial party secretary in Genoa and the city and cantonal
party presidents in Lausanne (both of whom were also among the
three councillors interviewed in Lausanne). Finally, we conducted
two group interviews in each city: one with six active grassroots
members of the Democratic Party in Genoa and one with six active
grassroots members of the Greens in Lausanne. Thus, a total of
30 people were interviewed for the project.1
MAYORS AND THEIR MULTIDIMENSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THE PARTY
In presenting our findings, we have divided our interviewees – in
addition to the mayors, of course – into three main groups that
broadly match the three faces of the party as defined by Katz and
Mair (1993): (1) the local secretaries of the mayor’s party (party in
local central office); (2) the party representatives in the mayor’s
executive and the city councillors (party in local public office); (3) the
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grassroots members (party on the ground). While some of these
relationships and actors partially overlap (for example, in Lausanne,
the local secretaries are also city councillors), for the sake of explanatory
clarity, we find it useful to keep these categories distinct. We will
therefore discuss these relationships in the order listed above, seeking to
find commonalities and differences between the two cases.
The Local Party Secretaries and the Mayor
Our interviews in Genoa and Lausanne indicate, first, that both
mayors overshadowed their local party secretaries and the party in
local central office and, second, that the balance of power – at least
for most of their terms in office – was seen by each side of the
relationship as being firmly in favour of the mayor. This is due to a
combination of those factors which we presented earlier. On the
one hand, it is because of the weight of the mayors’ institutional
roles, high personal support levels, media profiles and long political
histories. On the other, it reflects the current structural weaknesses
of their parties. So, to use the terms of our previous discussion: the
specific personal, partisan and institutional factors in these cities all
play key roles. In the case of the Greens in Lausanne, we are dealing
with a movement which has only recently begun to institutionalize
and, in that of the Democratic Party in Genoa, with a former mass
party which is in organizational decline and has recently attempted
to introduce a generational change in the local party leadership. In
Genoa, although the Democratic Party and the centre-left enjoyed
an uninterrupted period of success between 1993 and 2011, winning
all direct elections for the positions of mayor, provincial president
and regional president, this was accompanied by a withering of the
party as an organization. While its forerunner, the Italian Commu-
nist Party, had around 40,000 members in Genoa in the late 1980s,
data provided to us by the Democratic Party’s Genoa office show that
the party had just under 6,000 members in 2010. Moreover, this
decline is ongoing: the Genoa Left Democrats in 2006 had around
8,000 members and the fall to 6,000 in 2010 seems even steeper if we
consider that the Left Democrats merged with the centre-left
Margherita Party in 2007 to form the Democratic Party.
At the time of our research, the Democratic Party provincial
secretary – traditionally the most significant subnational party office
in the city – was Victor Rasetto. He had been elected secretary of the
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Democratic Party in late 2007 when aged just 35 (extremely young
by the standards of Italian politics). Rasetto (2011) in his interview
with us was very frank about the organizational difficulties he faced,
not only in terms of the party’s dwindling membership but also
concerning the resources at his disposal. As he said:
I have a young guy here who has just finished his law degree and he is
my communications officer. There is a secretary and two pensioners who
help me with organization. Then there is another secretary at regional
level and the treasury. And that’s it. Once upon a time there were
50 functionaries here! Even my recent predecessors Tullo and Benvenuti
had 10 functionaries! They had a specialist on economic matters paid for by
the party, a specialist on the port paid for by the party y and so on.
As regards his relationship with the mayor, Rasetto said that
‘basically, the mayor calls me when she has a problem’. In particular,
she would ask Rasetto to intercede when there were difficulties with
the party group in the council chamber. When asked how he viewed
the formal autonomy of the mayor, Rasetto claimed this was well
respected. Nonetheless, he said that he did seek to advise Vincenzi
on some appointments to public bodies and, in particular, he
believed he should have a strong say regarding the Democratic Party
representatives on the mayor’s executive (a power that, as we have
seen, is formally exclusive to the mayor).
The relationship was not made easy, Rasetto observed, by the
fact that ‘nowadays we are faced with heavily personalized mayors.
And Marta Vincenzi’s character is suited to that. She is a strong
presence. She wants to take all decisions.’ Rasetto also noted that
Vincenzi, although invited, did not always attend the party meetings
which he organized every couple of months to bring together the
Democratic Party’s representatives in Vincenzi’s executive and the
party councillors. In her interview with us, Vincenzi (2011) stated
that she ‘rarely attends’ party committee meetings of any kind
locally. One of the reasons she gave for this was that, at local level,
‘the debate has really become impoverished: it is like a little war
between people or factions.’ She added: ‘I am a member of the
party executive at national level and I go to that, but on the local
level, not really.’
The clear impression from our interview with Vincenzi was that
she did not place much value on receiving input from the local party
elites into her decisions. She explained that this was not just a
question of formal rules but was also for practical reasons: ‘often
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you have to decide something in just a few minutes. It’s not as if I can
call a meeting of a party committee.’ However, she said this is
something that ‘the [local] leaders of the party do not understand’.
Nonetheless, as we expected – given the importance of the party for
re-election – Rasetto confirmed that, as Vincenzi was entering the final
year of her first term in early 2011, he had noticed that she was now
listening to the party ‘much more’ than previously. This, he said, was
strongly linked to the increased leverage of the party on mayors seeking
re-election: ‘the party still has the great power to choose the mayor.
And it will be me, together with other party bodies, who will decide
whether Vincenzi is re-proposed as our candidate or not.’ Given this
role, Rasetto believed that, over the course of the mandate, the power
of the party ‘at the beginning is almost zero y but reaches its apex
near the elections’ and this holds true both for the mayor and for the
party representatives on the executive.
In Lausanne, Silvia Zamora (2011), a Socialist Party member of
the executive, made a similar point, observing that once elections
loom into view ‘one moves closer to the party. That’s when the party
counts.’ As for the Greens in the city, the relationship between the
party in local central office and the mayor seems to follow a similar
pattern to that in Genoa, with a distinction drawn by interviewees
between ‘policymaking periods’ and ‘election periods’. As Natalie
Lutzidorf (2011), president of the Greens in Lausanne since 2009
and a member of the council chamber, noted, meetings between the
party city committee and the mayor tended to be ‘more formal and
relatively less frequent than with the Green members of the council’,
but they ‘intensify as we get nearer to elections’. As in Genoa with
the Democratic Party, so too in Lausanne has the organizational
transformation of the Greens influenced the party’s relationship
with its mayor. The history of the Greens is a relatively short one and
they have grown very significantly in Canton Vaud (of which
Lausanne is the main city) over the past three decades. Bre´laz
(2011) commented during his interview with us that, in the 1970s,
‘when I began, everyone knew everyone. There were 15 of us. Now,
there are usually between 70 and 100 people at the party assemblies
in Lausanne and 200 in the assemblies for Canton Vaud.’ As has
been the case for many green parties on the continent (Frankland
et al. 2008), the party now not only has numerous elected representatives
at a range of institutional levels, but also contains members who have
joined the party during different periods of its development.
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An increased institutionalization of the party in Lausanne (where
the party has around 460 members) occurred during Bre´laz’s
second term in office, beginning in 2006. At this time, Yves Ferrari –
who had become president of the Greens in Lausanne in 2003 aged
just 29 – was elected to the position of Green Party president for the
canton. Having built a strong relationship with Bre´laz, he set about
modernizing the party organization in Vaud. Ferrari (2011) said that
he noticed a change in both his and the party’s relationship with
Bre´laz at this time, reflected not only in a greater role and visibility
for Ferrari as regional party president but for the party in general
vis-a`-vis the mayor. For example, Ferrari observed in his interview
with us that, ‘until recently, the media would always go to Bre´laz’ for
a ‘Green Party comment’; however, this had now begun to change.
With the electoral growth and the greater institutional weight of the
party, the organizational capacity also increased. Ferrari commented
that Bre´laz in recent years had realized that ‘not everything still
revolved solely around him’. As the Greens moved from being a
personalized party to a more institutionalized one, questions were
also increasingly asked about the autonomy of Bre´laz vis-a`-vis the
party, with members no longer simply being content that a party
representative held the mayoralty but also wanting greater degrees
of input and accountability. As regards Bre´laz’s attitude to the
party, Lutzidorf remarked that there had been tensions due to the
dismissive tone Bre´laz adopted in discussions with them (something
which was confirmed to us by other interviewees).
The Executive Members, City Councillors and the Mayor
Our next set of actors in the mayor–party relationship consist of
the party in public office: the members of the executive and the
council chamber. Although there are many obvious differences in
their competences, there is some degree of overlap between the two
careers: those in the executive have usually served as councillors while,
albeit less frequently, the reverse passage from executive to council also
occurs (in fact, two of the centre-left councillors we interviewed in
Genoa had been members of the previous mayor’s executive). They are
also both groups of representatives who find themselves – at different
points and to different degrees – in a zone between the mayor and
local government institutions on the one hand and the local party
secretariat and the grassroots membership on the other.
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As we have seen, while members of the executive are formally
appointed by the mayor in Genoa, the party secretary believed that
he should have a say in which Democratic Party representatives were
chosen. We found evidence that at least some appointments were
indeed the product of negotiations between the mayor and the
party. A Democratic Party member of Vincenzi’s executive, Simone
Farello (2011), told us:
I was nominated by the mayor, like all members of the executive. However, it
was on the basis of a negotiation process y according to old-style logics,
with my party. So I feel that I am a representative of my party. I do not only
feel like an appointee of the mayor. So I feel both these links of belonging
and this is sometimes difficult.
When asked whether the mayor ever consulted exclusively with her
fellow Democratic Party members of the executive before making
decisions, Farello said that this happened very rarely and that she
tended to interpret her role in this sense as super partes, not making a
distinction between the different executive members on the basis of
their party affiliations. It is worth noting on this point that another
member of Vincenzi’s executive whom we interviewed, Stefano
Anzalone (2011) of Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori – IDV), observed
that, while ‘she is very independent, with regard to her own partyy
on some questions, at least in the case of IDV, she always calls the
party secretaries to keep them informed’.
Giorgio Guerello (2011), a Democratic Party councillor and
president of the council chamber, told us that ‘the situation in
Genoa is very evident: the mayor herself points out that she is very
far from her party of origin.’ Both Guerello and Green Party
councillor Luca Dallorto also noted that, compared to Giuseppe
Perı`cu (centre-left mayor from 1997–2007), Vincenzi sent far fewer
issues for debate to the council chamber before taking a decision on
them. However, echoing Anzalone’s comment, Dallorto (2011)
added: ‘Vincenzi seems, in particular, to have a problem with her
own party. For example, she consults us y she consults me as a
councillor.’
In Lausanne, the Green executive member Jean-Yves Pidoux
(2011), noted that, while Bre´laz was very good at avoiding conflicts
in the executive and acted extremely collegially there, he did not
have the same attitude when he met Green members of the council
chamber or party bodies. Over time, we were told, the mayor had
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become more ‘impatient’ and less willing to discuss his decisions.
When interviewed in January 2011, Pidoux observed that Bre´laz
was selective about what he listened to from the Green Party group
in the council chamber. For his part, Bre´laz said his relationship
with the Greens in the city council chamber was ‘very clear’, citing
the example that ‘if we come to an agreement on a project within
the executive after two years of work, opposition from the Green
Party in the council chamber is not going to block it’. When asked
about his relationship with the executive and his party group,
Bre´laz put it as follows: ‘my role is to defend the projects of the
executive before my party group and the chamber. Sometimes
I do it in a very resolute fashion, particularly on financial issues.
There are people who understand nothing about these questions.’
Our overall impression from interviewees in Lausanne was that this
attitude on the part of the mayor had created a relationship with
some local party elites and elected representatives which was both
distant and tense.
The Grassroots Members and the Mayor
Our final category is the members of the party – the party on
the ground. In the group interviews conducted in both cities, we
found that, although members accepted in principle that the mayor
should be super partes, they often had difficulty in practice with
this. In particular, it emerged that members viewed the relationship
as being too one-sided, with the party and its members dedicating
time and effort to campaigning, but then not being sufficiently
considered and listened to once ‘their’ mayor was in office. Both
in Genoa and Lausanne, this was something which the respective
party secretaries had already spoken to us about. In Genoa, Rasetto
commented that ‘the members feel an enormous distance, an
abyss, from local government’. It should be noted, however, that
Vincenzi offered a rather different perspective, putting the blame
for members being frustrated on the failings of the party itself to
provide linkage.
As was also the case in Lausanne, we conducted one group
interview in Genoa (albeit with members from different areas of
the city). As such, our findings only represent a snapshot of the
sentiments of a selection of members. That aside, we did encounter
considerable discontent with the mayor among those we spoke to
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in Genoa in August 2011. One comment by Franco, a 22-year-old
member (of the Democratic Party and, before that, the Left
Democrats since he was at school) provides a good example of
what we have discussed above. He told us:
I think the mayor should answer to her party. I think it is right that the
mayor is elected by the citizens and that she is autonomous in her actions in
some respects, and that she should be the mayor of everyone. However she
should not forget that she was elected on a platform that has been
constructed by the party that supports her.
Rocco, a 34-year-old member (of the party and its predecessors
since his teens), said that he accepted the super partes role of the
mayor, but added: ‘in our areas of the city, we are there on
the ground doing our utmost to defend some of her decisions, but
we would like that some of those decisions were in line with what
we had hoped for!’ Alfio, a 75-year-old member (who had been a
member of the Italian Communist Party and its successors up to and
including the Democratic Party) said that he would like mayoral
candidates who paid more attention to the grassroots. Referring to
the case of Vincenzi, he commented: ‘the party contributed to her
victoryy with money from everyone, by going out and collecting it.
I think that, if someone gives you money, you should at least listen to
what they have to say.’ On a similar note, Sandro, a 54-year-old
member (who, again, had been in the party since the days of the
Italian Communist Party), alluded ironically to how directly elected
mayors act towards their parties, saying that: ‘unless I am wrong, it is
those disgraceful parties that finance the election campaign, no?’
In Lausanne too, we found discontent with the mayor among the
party members. This had grown in particular following Bre´laz’s
decision to stand in the 2007 federal election (thus taking on a dual
mandate). As a result, the Green Party of Vaud adopted a new rule
that party representatives would no longer be allowed sit in both
the federal parliament and the executives of cities with more than
10,000 inhabitants. Referring to this episode, Ferrari says of the
mayor’s relationship with the grassroots:
while he certainly remains someone who is popular with the general public,
you can detect within the party, among the grassroots, the view that we could
do without Bre´lazy it is a view expressed by a whole series of new members,
particularly those who do not have a historical perspective, who have not
lived through the earlier years of the party.
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Like the Democratic Party grassroots members in Genoa, those of
the Greens in Lausanne also said, when interviewed in December
2011, that they accepted the super partes role of the mayor while, at
the same time, underlining the need for him to take into account
what the party stands for. Claude, a 66-year-old who had been a
member of the Green movement since 1973, said: ‘the mayor has to
stick to the spirit of the fundamental values of his party y but he
also has to consider the general interest. He has to stick to his
party’s values, but without being sectarian.’ Be´atrice (46-years-old, a
member since 2007) said that she thought the mayor ‘should not
stand alone and should be capable of asking for advice from the
grassroots and the party secretariat’. This does not happen, she
explained, because ‘I have the impression that the mayor of
Lausanne knows everything and nobody can suggest anything to
himy perhaps it is because he has served several terms, or simply
a question of personalityy but he is not really in contact with the
grassroots.’
Claude and Robin (a 73-year-old who had been in the party since
its early days) both drew attention to the effects of Bre´laz’s long
institutional career, while Bernard (a 70-year-old who had been in
the party since the 1970s) commented that ‘Daniel Bre´laz’s charisma
lasted for four or five legislaturesy but now I think we’re dealing
with charisma which is a bit residual.’ Claude, who had often
opposed the party’s decisions in recent years, was very clear in his
judgement on Bre´laz, criticizing the fact that he had changed from
being a man of the movement to a politician of the institutions.
In his view, Bre´laz was ‘originally elected because he was a really
committed activisty.we worked together on the anti-nuclear campaign
and it was a real pleasure y afterwards, unfortunately, he was
intoxicated by powery I voted willingly for him in 2007, but then
I felt betrayed.’
EPILOGUE AND DISCUSSION
It is worth presenting here a brief epilogue to our two cases: in late
2011, the centre-left alliance in Genoa announced that it would hold
a primary to decide its candidate for the mayoral election in 2012.
This was a new development since the unwritten rule until then had
been that primaries were only held in those cases where a sitting
111DIRECTLY ELECTED MAYORS AND THEIR PARTIES
Jc The Authors 2013. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
centre-left mayor was not standing again for election. While not
amounting to a formal deselection, this was clearly a very serious
challenge to Vincenzi’s position. It was subsequently reinforced by
the Democratic Party senator from Genoa, Roberta Pinotti,
announcing (supported by various figures within the local party
elite) that she would stand in the primary. If this was considered a
fairly safe tactic to remove an uncooperative mayor at a time when
the party was doing well in the polls nationally, it was a miscalculation.
Vincenzi decided nonetheless to stand in the primaries and, given the
first-past-the-post system used, the splitting of the Democratic Party vote
between Vincenzi and Pinotti – and the tensions this created within the
party’s electorate – left the way open for a third centre-left coalition
candidate, Marco Doria (an independent, backed by the far left party
Left and Freedom – Sinistra e Liberta`). Doria took 46 per cent of the
vote in the February 2012 primary, well ahead of both Vincenzi on 27.5
per cent and Pinotti on 26.3 per cent. This marked the end not only
for the mayor but also for Rasetto, who resigned as party secretary
immediately afterwards. Doria duly won the mayoral election in May.
The poor relationship between mayor and party during Vincenzi’s
tenure thus ultimately produced a negative-sum outcome in which
both sides lost – albeit Vincenzi more so than the Democratic Party,
which at least remains part of the centre-left governing coalition in
local public office.
In Lausanne, the decline of Bre´laz’s appeal both within his own
party and among the wider public has resulted in the acceptance by
all sides that his current term in office will be his last. Hence, the
Greens will no longer hold the mayoralty – which will almost
inevitably return to the majority party of the coalition, the Socialist
Party. The Greens in Lausanne also appear to have paid a price
electorally for the slide in popularity of the mayor. In 2011, for the
first time since 2001, the party lost support in the city council
elections (decreasing from 21.7 to 17.7 per cent). This seems a
by-product of tying a party’s image for so long and so closely to one
figure: when the latter’s image becomes worn, so too does that of the
party. The challenge now for the Greens – which, as we have seen,
has been taken up by their new secretaries in recent years – is to
construct a party organizational structure and public identity that
can outlast the compelling presence of Bre´laz. Nonetheless, despite
the tensions revealed in the interviews, the relationship between
mayor and party in Lausanne has broadly had a positive-sum
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outcome. Without Bre´laz, it seems unlikely that the Greens would
have enjoyed the success (and much greater profile) they had in
Lausanne and Vaud over the past decade.
To return to the three faces of the party that have accompanied
us throughout this article, we can say that, on the evidence
presented here, the directly elected mayors in our two cases for
much of their time in office possessed considerable personal capital
resources of the types discussed earlier and attached little
importance to cultivating their relationships with their own party
either in public office or on the ground. The latter (the party
members) in particular, while accepting that their mayor must also be
the mayor ‘of all’, seemed to have significant difficulties accepting the
perceived distant relationship with him/her. We suggest that this
becomes a problem for mayors only when their general popularity
declines and/or party institutionalization increases. Otherwise, in a
time of open primaries and/or generally declining membership levels,
it would seem that the thesis of Katz and Mair is confirmed locally as
regards the distance from the party in governing institutions felt by
those in the party on the ground. As for the relationship between the
mayor and the party in public office, we have seen that this is strongly
shaped by the different opportunity structures under directly elected
systems and whether the mayoralty, in both its formal powers and
leadership styles, is more or less presidentialized. While there are
differences in this sense between our two cases, we found in both cities
that the party of the mayor in public office (that is, party members of
the executive and city councillors) seemed to count for little.
The situation is partially different for the relationship between
the mayor and the party in local central office, which – although in
neither case entirely satisfied with the mayor’s attitude towards it –
does seem to receive more attention from the mayor than the other
two faces of the party, especially during the final year of his/her
term in government if seeking re-election. We believe that, at least in
these two cases, the evidence is that the most significant face of the
party for the mayor–party relationship is therefore the party in local
central office – especially, but not only, when the personal capital of
the mayor is in decline and/or the mayor is seeking another term.
To different degrees, and while these can of course overlap at times
with the party in central office, the relationships between the mayor
and the rest of the party in public office or the party on the ground
appear generally less significant. This greater importance of the
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party in central office among the set of relationships which the
mayor has with the three faces of the party suggests that, while Katz
and Mair’s theory (1993) of the pre-eminence of the party in public
office may apply at national level, the combination of different
structural opportunities locally can produce a different outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
Discussing studies of elected mayors, Colin Copus (2009: 27) notes that
‘what we see with most categorisations of mayoral leadership is an
absence of any account of the relationship between the mayor and the
political parties of which they may be members, or with which they may
have to co-operate.’ This article has attempted to provide just such an
account, by means of a qualitative case study of the mayors and their
parties in Genoa and Lausanne. As expected, we found that, in both
cases, the mayors are – to different degrees – more what Copus (2006:
66–7) refers to as ‘party detached’ than ‘party loyalist’. Interestingly,
although it was not the focus of this article, it also emerged from our
interviews that both mayors may not have been ‘coalition detached’ in
the same way as they were ‘party detached’. In other words, the
relationship with their own parties was taken for granted by the mayors
more than that with the other parties of their coalitions. This seems a
worthwhile line of investigation in further research on the mayor–party
relationship, especially given that, in many countries, mayors are
supported by a coalition rather than one single party.
We also found that the relationship with their parties is not always
the same throughout the mayor’s term in office. However, on this
point we need to distinguish between the different faces of the party,
since it is particularly with regard to the party in local central office
that the relationship changes over time. Local party secretaries
in both Genoa and Lausanne confirmed that, as the mayors (and
members of the executive) come to the end of their mandates,
much more attention is paid to the party in local central office.
While we suspected that this would be the case, it underlines that we
should not treat the relationships between mayors and the different
faces of the party as static ones which are constantly conducted
under the same structural conditions and with unchanging
possibilities of agency (on the parts of both mayors and local
secretaries). While the agency of the party may be weakened for
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much of the period in which a popular directly elected mayor is in
office, it reacquires leverage as fresh elections loom into view. This is
in line with the observation by Magnier (2004: 177) that ‘the
influence of political parties, weak as they are perceived to be, is
nevertheless a major determinant in the choice of the ‘‘big’’ mayors’
and that, while there are some exceptions, generally ‘excessive
independence in managing a city does not lead to re-election’. This
is particularly the case if the mayor’s own electoral appeal is in
decline (Bre´laz) or if the party’s own support levels in the city are
high (Vincenzi). In sum, we found that the autonomy and survival
prospects of the mayor depend greatly on his/her personal capital –
especially symbolic-reputational capital – along with the degree of
organizational and electoral strength of the party.
This brings us to another important point: while the literature on
parties has spoken predominantly of decline, it may be better at local
level to also speak of party active adaptation to new rules. Party
membership may be much lower than in the past (van Biezen et al.
2012) – particularly in the case of (former) mass parties – and party
organizations and local elites may struggle to keep pace with local
democracy reforms, the presidentialization of institutional roles
and the personalization of campaigns. But ultimately, as we have
stressed throughout this article, parties in local central office retain
considerable power over who does and does not become mayor. To
be sure, mayors can exploit the personal, partisan and institutional
factors outlined earlier both in the electoral arena and in office,
but the cultivation of a good relationship with one’s own party at
local level – particularly the party in local central office – can prove
highly valuable. So, as we have said, while party bureaucracies
may no longer be as strong both in terms of own resources and
formal power vis-a`-vis the mayors as in the past (this is the case, for
example, in Genoa), they can still wage considerable influence over
the mayor’s continuation in office – a factor that is likely to have an
impact on the relationship between mayors and their parties,
particularly in the latter stages of mayors’ terms in office if they are
seeking re-election.
Finally, and more generally, we believe that our cases show the
benefits of considering the relationship between the party and the
mayor as a dynamic multifaceted phenomenon taking place within
a contextual configuration of opportunities and constraints. Such
an approach in future research – conducted in cities with different
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structural opportunities and different institutional, personal and
partisan factors – could help to shed further light on the so-far opaque
relationships between directly elected mayors and their parties.
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NOTES
1 We devised guides for all interviews which investigated individually each aspect of
the mayor’s relationship with the three faces of the party – in local public office, in
local central office and on the ground – from the perspective of the interviewee.
Interviews in Genoa were conducted in Italian and those in Lausanne were
conducted in French. All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and then
analysed using NVivo 9. When quoted for the first time in the text, names of the
mayors, party secretaries, members of the municipal executive and city councillors
are all given along with their roles at the time of interview. Access to members was
gained through contacts with the party offices in each city. Given the small sample
size and the associated dangers of relying on a random sample, a purposive
sampling strategy was used as far as possible for the members. Interviewees were all
active members (they had participated in party activities at local level that year), and
a wide range of ages (from 22 to 73 in Genoa; from 20 to 72 in Lausanne) was
covered. Ordinary members were guaranteed anonymity. Pseudonyms have there-
fore been used instead of their real names.
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